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THE EXPERIENCE OF HEARING VOICES: AN INTERPRETATIVE 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Abstract: This article presents an analysis of two case studies of people who hear 
voices. In accordance with a phenomenological approach, the meanings which the 
participants attribute to their voices are highlighted in the analysis (specifically in 
relation to the nature and origin of the voices) and the influence which these 
interpretations have on their efforts at managing and reducing their disruptive effects 
is explored. It is concluded that if this analysis has accessed general processes in 
voice hearers’ experiences, therapeutic practitioners may need to work with voice 
hearers in promoting psychologically satisfying meaning-making around their 
experiences, from which contextualised responses to managing the voices can be 
developed. 
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THE EXPERIENCE OF HEARING VOICES: AN INTERPRETATIVE 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Introduction 
Much research has been undertaken to investigate the coping strategies of people who 
experience auditory hallucinations (see Knudson and Coyle, 1999, for a review). 
However, most of this work has paid inadequate attention to participants’ 
interpretative frameworks and the ways in which they attempt to understand their 
experiences and explain their coping efforts (for an exception, see Romme and 
Escher, 1989). 
 
The paucity of studies which have examined voice hearers’ interpretations of their 
experiences represents a limitation in the coping literature, as one would expect the 
nature of voice-hearers’ interpretative and explanatory frameworks to bear directly on 
their coping efforts. Indirect evidence for this link is provided by the commonly-
reported finding that although instruction in behavioural coping methods can have 
clinically significant effects, many patients do not continue to use these methods 
following instruction (Allen et al., 1985; Erickson and Gustafson, 1968; Nelson et al., 
1991). Fowler et al. (1995) have suggested that the reason for this is that the 
individuals’ conceptualisations of their voices were not consistent with the use of the 
particular coping strategies in which they were instructed. For example, distraction 
techniques, although effective in reducing the intensity of hallucinations, are unlikely 
to be used if someone believes that their voices will punish any failure to attend to 
them. 
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At a more general level, the subjective meaning of hallucinations (in various sense 
modalities) has been relatively ignored in the psychological literature (although see 
du Plock, 1995; Hulme, 1996; Jung, 1908/1914; Leudar and Thomas, 2000; and 
Romme and Escher, 1993, for notable exceptions). Boyle (1990) has suggested that 
the main reason for this is that a content-free analysis of hallucinations - and therefore 
an emphasis on form rather than content - is considered more likely to meet the 
criteria of an ‘objective’ science. However, this conceptualisation of the scientific 
method has been criticised as being too narrow. For example, from an existential-
phenomenological viewpoint, Giorgi (1995) has argued that for knowledge to be 
considered scientific, it must be (i) systematic, (ii) methodical, (iii) critical and (iv) 
general. However, he points out that how one conducts an inquiry which is 
systematic, methodical, critical and general is very different depending on whether or 
not the object of study possesses consciousness. While psychology has traditionally 
modelled itself on the natural sciences, phenomenological psychologists would argue 
that the subject matter of psychology (i.e., conscious beings) requires a different 
theoretical and methodological approach, and one which allows psychology to 
establish itself specifically as a human science rather than a natural science. 
Accordingly, the priorities of the phenomenological approach to psychological 
research shift from a concern with objectivity, measurement and causation to a 
greater emphasis on personal subjectivities, meaning and interpretation (see Smith et 
al., 1995a). 
 
Consonant with the aims and priorities of phenomenological psychology, the present 
study attempts to explore in some depth the personal experience of two individuals 
who hear voices, describe the meaning which they attribute to their experience and 
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consider how these meanings might influence their personal coping styles. The 
approach which is adopted in this study, then, is idiographic in that the concern was 
to capture the detailed, particular and complex processes in these individuals’ 
accounts of their voices, in contrast to the nomothetic approach of most psychological 
inquiry which is based on statistical comparisons of group means (see Harré, 1979, 
Smith et al., 1995b, and Yin, 1994, for more on the idiographic approach). 
 
Method 
Potential participants for the study were contacted from the case-load of a consultant 
psychiatrist working in the NHS in the south east of England. Patients were 
considered eligible for the study if they were aged between 18 and 65; did not suffer 
from any organic condition which was likely to cause auditory hallucinations; 
reported having the experience of ‘hearing noises or voices which other people 
cannot hear’; were willing to talk about these experiences; and were able to consent 
to participate in a fully informed way. Patients who met these criteria and who – in 
the psychiatrist’s opinion – would not find it overly distressing to talk about their 
experiences were invited to participate in the research.  
 
Following this screening procedure, five patients were contacted and interviewed. 
However, data from only two participants are reported here because of the need to 
balance a desire to convey the detail and complexity of individual accounts with the 
space constraints imposed by writing for publication. These accounts were provided 
by Lucy and Neil, both of whom had a diagnosis of schizophrenia according to DSM-
IV criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) and were receiving psychiatric 
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treatment on an outpatient basis at the time of the interview. The participants’ names 
have been changed to preserve confidentiality. 
 
Each participant was interviewed using a semi-structured interview schedule. 
Transcripts of the interviews were subjected to interpretative phenomenological 
analysis (IPA) – a method which offers a way of analysing qualitative data in an 
idiographic and systematic manner and which aims to explore participants’ 
experiences, cognitions and meaning-making (Smith, 1996a; Smith et al., 1997, 
1999). IPA recognises that the outcome of any qualitative analysis represents an 
interaction between participants’ accounts and the researchers’ interpretative 
frameworks; hence, the analysis is both phenomenological and interpretative. For a 
detailed account of the nature of the analytic process, see Smith et al. (1999).  
 
In interpretative analysis such as this, traditional criteria for evaluating research 
quality (such as reliability) – which are based on an assumption of researcher 
objectivity and disengagement from the analytic process – are inappropriate 
(Henwood and Pidgeon, 1992). Among the alternative criteria which qualitative 
researchers have suggested is the criterion of persuasiveness by ‘grounding in 
examples’, which is applied through an inspection of interpretations and data (Elliott 
et al., 1999; Smith, 1996b). In this article, interpretations are illustrated by data 
extracts to allow readers to assess the persuasiveness of the analysis for themselves. 
In the quotations, empty square brackets indicate where material has been omitted, 
material within square brackets is provided for clarification and ellipsis points (...) 
indicate a pause in the flow of participants’ speech; in quotations involving dialogue 
between the interviewer and the participants, the interviewer is referred to as ‘Ben’. 
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Analysis 
 
1. Lucy 
Lucy was a 31-year-old woman who had been hearing voices for the last ten years. 
She had had a number of hospitalisations during that time; at the time of the 
interview, she was seeing a psychiatrist and a community psychiatric nurse on an 
outpatient basis. She was taking a number of anti-psychotic and other psychiatric 
drugs (Clozapine, Procyclidine, Amitriptyline and Droperidol), but continued to hear 
voices almost continuously. She lived at home with her mother and worked part-time 
in a hair-dressing salon. 
 
Identity and content of the voices 
Lucy reported that currently she hears two main voices, although she used to hear as 
many as 12 separate voices when she was first admitted to hospital ten years ago. In 
her account she represented these two voices as having clearly differentiated 
identities and personality characteristics as the following extract demonstrates: 
 
I mean, there are two voices – Simon and Jeremy. Simon’s...um...like a demon 
really. He’s very demonic and he...um...[ ] he says people read my mind and 
they know I’m evil...um...I’ve got a year to live, that if I don’t do as I’m told 
the horrible horseman of the Apocalypse will come and get me and kill me 
and Armageddon will come and the world will be destroyed. And then Jeremy 
– he’s just a little boy, he’s just full of fun, you know, he’ll tell me things like 
– um – ‘Move the food from the cupboard and put it in mum’s chest of 
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drawers’ [ ] Just stupid things like that. It’s funny but it’s – it is annoying 
really. 
 
Benjamin (1989) has shown that psychiatric patients experiencing auditory 
hallucinations have integrated, interpersonally coherent relationships with their 
voices and Lucy’s account illustrated this. During the interview, the different 
‘personalities’ of ‘Simon’ and ‘Jeremy’ became more apparent, as did Lucy’s 
emotional reactions towards them. Although both voices were generally experienced 
as persecutory, Simon was constructed as more obviously harmful and was described 
as ‘evil’, whereas Jeremy was simply described as ‘mischievous’ - consistent with the 
‘little boy’ identity ascribed to him. 
 
The construction of meaning 
Taylor (1983) proposed a theory of cognitive adaptation to threatening events, in 
which the search for meaning in the experience and an attempt to regain mastery 
following the event are central components of the adjustment process. This section 
examines Lucy’s search for meaning in her experience of hearing voices, while the 
following section focuses on the theme of regaining mastery by considering her 
reported responses to the voices. 
 
Romme and Escher (1989) have discussed the importance of constructing meaning 
during the early stages of learning to cope with voices, as this can help to reduce 
anxiety in the face of what is often a rather frightening experience. In her account, 
Lucy’s search for meaning was said to have been initiated immediately following the 
onset of her voices. This was an experience which she found difficult to understand 
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and so the need for an explanation was of paramount importance. In the following 
passage, she described her reaction to the onset of the voices as well as the 
importance of finding a suitable explanation for this experience: 
 
Lucy: And then all of a sudden I was just listening to my Walkman and I 
heard a voice that’s on it, talking to me. [ ] I thought ‘My walkman’s picked 
up the radio’ when I was playing the tape. There was this disbelief. I couldn’t 
believe it [ ] 
Ben: So at first you thought it was the radio that was playing instead of your 
tape? 
 Lucy: Yeah. Yeah, but I didn’t have a radio on my walkman. 
 Ben: Right, right. And then what did you think after that, after... 
Lucy: That I was going mad. So I went to see a doctor and I told him [ ] ‘Look 
I’m hearing things’ and he told me it was...well, he referred me to a 
psychiatrist. [ ] 
 Ben: And then what happened? 
Lucy: Um...put me in hospital for a while. And I still didn’t know what was 
going on. [ ] But I did try...I did do my very best to try and find a purpose and 
meaning to it all cos it really did shake me up. 
 
Because of the distressing and bizarre nature of Lucy’s experience, the need for an 
explanation was particularly insistent. Her search for meaning seemed to have 
consisted of an attempt to understand why the voices were occurring as well as the 
significance of the voices. In relation to both issues, a multiplicity of meanings 
emerged in her account, perhaps because of the inadequacy of a unitary or 
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reductionist explanation in accounting for the complexity of her experience. For 
example, with regard to her conceptualisation of the nature of the voices, she 
sometimes referred to them as ‘spirit guides’ and at other times as ‘hallucinations’. 
Thus, she appeared to vary in her belief about the ‘reality’ of the voices, sometimes 
invoking a personal experiential framework for determining ‘reality’: 
 
You see, sometimes I know that they’re talking to me and it’s rubbish and 
sometimes I get carried away and I can’t tell reality from what’s what. [ ] Cos 
I know this is – this is just a voice, it’s not really there but um... He [Simon] is 
real to me because I hear it and it’s disturbing. 
 
One way around this dilemma concerning the ‘reality’ of the voices is to extend this 
personal framework idea and consider them as aspects of the self. This 
conceptualisation of the voices seems to represent a compromise position in which 
the illusory nature of the voices is acknowledged and yet they retain their 
meaningfulness and can be interpreted as representing different aspects of one’s 
personality. This theory about the voices is reminiscent of certain psychodynamic 
accounts of psychotic phenomena (for example, see Bion, 1957; Spillius, 1988) and is 
an idea which Lucy briefly and tentatively touched upon in the following passage: 
 
[Simon] is like a demonic voice. He’s my bad – he’s like my bad half of me – 
anything that I want to do but it’s not allowed [ ]. I mean it must be something 
to do with my personality because...um...why do I hear it? It must be 
something to do with me that’s...[ ] It must be some part of your personality 
coming out. I don’t know. I get a bit confused. 
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The last part of this passage indicates that this is not a theory which has been fully 
worked out and accepted as the most persuasive interpretation concerning the nature 
of the voices. Rather than insisting on a unitary or internally coherent interpretation, 
Lucy seemed to be creatively drawing upon a rich explanatory repertoire. Such 
variability may indicate the experience is so unusual that maximum explanatory 
investment is required to make sense of it to herself and others. Similarly, with regard 
to the causal attributions which Lucy made concerning the onset of her voices, a 
number of explanations were put forward:  
 
I had two jobs – I was a disc-jockey and I was a cook. But I was getting 
depressed and...um...my flat-mates asked me to leave [ ]. But I...I lost my jobs 
that week. I lost my home. It was just a bit too much and it just all...it – it 
worked on me, it wore me down. And I think – I believe that started it. But 
also, you know, I just had lots of drugs, mixture of psychotic drugs. I used to 
do...take a lot of acid, about three or four tabs a night, three times a week. And 
that didn’t help. 
 
Later on in the interview she returned to the theme that her drug use might have been 
a precipitating factor in the onset of the voices, and added another possible 
explanation: 
 
I don’t know to this day whether I would’ve got...I would’ve been 
schizophrenic if I hadn’t taken drugs and whether it’s just drug induced [ ]. It 
certainly didn’t help. But then, like... like, um, in all my school reports when I 
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was younger, all my teachers said I was mentally...I’d – I’d be mentally ill 
when I was older if I didn’t get help. So it’s, um, I was...not highly strung, 
just...um... disturbed. You know, troubled. Because I was so sensitive. I still 
am sensitive. And that doesn’t help. 
 
Two further possible explanations were put forward in the next passage: 
 
 Ben: Why do you think you first began to hear voices, looking back on it 
now? 
 Lucy: It could be...um, penance. For taking drugs. You know, God punishing 
me. Or it could be that it’s just in my family genes [ ]. So it could be that. But 
I think it’s just probably God punishing me for taking all those drugs. 
 
As we can see – as with her explanations about the nature of the voices – Lucy 
expressed considerable uncertainty about the possible causes of this experience. 
Nevertheless she offered a number of possible explanations, including attributions to 
adverse life events, the consumption of hallucinogenic drugs, an underlying 
sensitivity or genetic vulnerability, and divine retribution. The diversity of causal 
explanations offered by Lucy may reflect the uncertainty in medical and scientific 
communities about the origins of auditory hallucinations and of schizophrenia more 
generally (Lemma, 1996; Parker et al., 1995). Similarly, Taylor et al. (1984) found 
that many of the women with breast cancer (another condition the causes of which are 
relatively uncertain, especially to the non-medical person) whom they interviewed 
listed several possible causes of their cancer (although others have found less 
explanatory diversity among people with cancer: see Jacobsen et al., 2000). By 
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holding multiple theories about the cause of their condition, people such as Lucy 
might be doing the best they can in attempting to find meaning in the face of causal 
uncertainty. 
 
Strategies for reducing the voices’ disruptive effects 
The diversity evident in Lucy’s explanations of her voices was also evident in her 
discussion of strategies for reducing the voices’ disruptive effects. While a wide 
variety of coping strategies was described, her efforts seemed to centre around three 
main strategies: (i) sensory stimulation, in an attempt to block out the voices; (ii) 
social contact, serving the dual purpose of providing emotional support as well as 
obtaining insight about the nature of the voices; and (iii) release of tension, by going 
for a brisk walk and shouting back at the voices. 
 
Many studies which have investigated voice-hearers’ coping strategies have found 
that increasing levels of sensory stimulation is a widely used method for coping with 
voices (Carr, 1988; Carr and Katsikitis, 1987; Falloon and Talbot, 1981; Frederick 
and Cotanch, 1995; Tarrier, 1987). For Lucy, this consisted of listening to her 
Walkman or, if the voices were particularly intrusive, switching on the radio and the 
television at the same time in order to ‘drown out’ the voices: 
 
 Lucy: I put my telly and put my radio on at the same time. And it’s confusion. 
[ ] It’s just organised chaos. [ ] There’s so much going on – it’s just like 
you’ve shouted a big ‘Shut up’. 
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Social contact is another common strategy in dealing with hallucinations which has 
been widely reported in the literature (Carr, 1988; Carr and Katsikitis, 1987; Cohen 
and Berk, 1985; Falloon and Talbot, 1981; O’Sullivan, 1994; Tarrier, 1987). Lucy’s 
discussion of this coping method emphasised the importance of social support and the 
possibility of achieving insight into the nature of her experience through discussion 
with others. However, she reported that she is selective about those with whom she 
shares her experiences as she feels that some people, such as her mother, might find it 
distressing. Instead, she said that she prefers to talk to mental health professionals or 
other voice-hearers, perhaps because of their greater potential for understanding her 
experience: 
 
 Lucy: I never talk to my mum about it. 
 Ben: Why is that? 
 Lucy: Well – cos she’s – um...you see, she’s very depressive herself. But – um 
– I just don’t want to burden her and make her feel worse and, you know, put 
a strain on her. So there’s one of my key-workers that...I talk to him about it. 
But not to my mum. [ ] 
 Ben: Right. So what is it like to talk with your nurse? 
 Lucy: Alright. He – he helps a lot. He explains it. [ ] 
 Ben: What is it that’s helpful about...? 
 Lucy: Well, it’s just talking. It’s like...a problem shared is a problem halved 
sort of thing. Just talking. Especially when you can get answers about as to 
why it happens. And the more insight you get, the better you can control it. I 
find, anyway. 
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The importance of ‘insight’ (in the form of a causal explanation) is emphasised here 
as a means of coping with the voices. Lucy’s concern with achieving insight and 
getting ‘answers about as to why it happens’ seemed to be linked to the themes 
discussed in the previous section, namely her relative uncertainty about the nature 
and causes of  her experience of hearing voices. 
 
The third coping strategy which Lucy described consisted of going for a brisk walk 
and shouting back at the voices: 
 
I used to - I used to enjoy going for a long walk because that way I could talk 
to the voices. I used to go across the Downs and talk...answer the voices – tell 
them...I’d shout at them, cos I was the only person on the Downs – tell them 
to leave me alone and go away - bugger off, you know? [ ] It releases a lot of 
pent-up emotions and tension. 
 
Later, she described this process of releasing tension in greater detail: 
 
 It gets rid of the tension. Like I say - when I go for walks I look quite violent, 
walking at a real pace and, you know, really letting out the energy. [ ] There’s 
like - there’s the blood pumping and the adrenalin’s going and you can really 
get out some aggression. You see, I’m not the sort of person that would be 
aggressive towards other people. You know, if they were in the same room I 
could keep it in. I could pull my feelings in and that’s - that’s why it’s so 
dangerous. You know, I just - like - explode. 
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Lucy seemed to be relating the efficacy of this cathartic technique to the fact that she 
is generally a person who keeps her aggressive emotions in check, thus leading to a 
build-up of aggressive energy. Going for an energetic walk was represented as an 
effective way of releasing this accumulated tension. The hydraulic theme of allowing 
aggressive energy to build up, creating a need for catharsis, was elaborated in greater 
detail by the other participant whose account is presented in this article. 
 
2. Neil 
Neil was a 26 year-old man who reported that he first began to hear voices about six 
years ago. He was admitted to an acute psychiatric ward two years ago for a period of 
five weeks but has since been living at home with his mother. He continues to see a 
psychiatrist every two months and takes 400 mg of Sulpiride daily to keep the voices 
under control. 
 
Onset, nature and content of the voices 
In response to the question of when he first began to hear voices, Neil expressed 
considerable uncertainty. This difficulty in establishing the exact date of onset 
seemed to be due to a difficulty in distinguishing between ‘ordinary’ thoughts and 
voices: 
 
 Ben: To begin with, I wonder if you can tell me when you first heard voices? 
 Neil: Um...when I first heard voices...that’s quite a difficult one, 
actually...uh...probably about a year ago. [ ] I don’t know - maybe it was a 
little bit before that because...um...I don’t know. It’s hard to say whether 
they’re voices or thoughts you know. [ ] I don’t know...My mum says that she 
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has thoughts pop into her head. But I don’t know if that’s a thought or an 
audible voice you know. I don’t know what she means by that. You know - 
what is the thought, sort of thing? How can you tell you’re thinking 
something?...Well, I mean, when you have a thought popping into your head, 
is it a voice talking to you? 
 
Eventually, however, Neil became clearer about the date of onset and also elaborated 
the distinction, as he understood it, between voices and thoughts: 
 
 Neil: I mean I’ve been probably hearing voices for...since about...um...well, 
the earliest I can remember it back to was when I was about twenty, really. 
Yeah. Can’t remember having them before that. Yeah – probably about 
twenty started hearing voices. Or a voice anyway. 
 Ben: A voice? Right. And does that voice identify itself? 
 Neil: Well, it’s mostly just...uh - don’t know - sounds like me. Well, it can’t 
really...No it’s not - you can’t really hear it. Well you can hear it - you know 
it’s happening but it’s not like a voice that’s got any tone to it. [ ] 
 Ben: Right. What do you mean by that? 
 Neil: Well you know when you think a thought, yeah? It doesn’t sound like 
you’re saying it, does it? 
 Ben: Right.  
 Neil: It sounds like you’re - um...It’s - it’s something that you recognise as 
your thought, isn’t it? [ ] Uh - it’s like a whisper, isn’t it? It’s more silent. You 
know, thoughts are kind of more silent - they don’t have that kind of vocal 
tone to them. 
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 Ben: Right. 
 Neil: That’s mostly what these are like really. It’s more like a thought out of 
control. 
 
Neil seemed to be drawing a distinction here between internal ‘sounds’ (such as 
auditory hallucinations and thoughts) which do not have any ‘vocal tone’ and external 
sounds (such as other people’s voices) which do. In phenomenological terminology 
this corresponds to the distinction between immanent and transcendent objects (see 
Giorgi, 1995). In his interpretative framework, then, the aural quality of 
hallucinations and thoughts was similar insofar as they were both characterised by an 
absence of ‘vocal tone’ and could be contrasted with sounds which originated from an 
external source and which possessed this quality. The distinction between thoughts 
and hallucinations (which are both immanent objects), however, was less clear cut in 
this account, although the element of control was an important discriminating factor 
here. Neil seemed to be saying that auditory hallucinations are characterised by a lack 
of control or volition (‘It’s more like a thought out of control’), which would explain 
his difficulty in distinguishing between a hallucination and ‘a thought popping into 
your head’. 
 
This reflects a strong contrast between Neil and Lucy in terms of the nature and 
intensity of their experience. Lucy was able to provide a definite account about the 
onset of her voices, presumably because this represented a clear departure from her 
normal experience, whereas Neil had difficulty in establishing the date of onset 
because of the similarity between his voices and ordinary thoughts. This difference in 
the nature of Lucy and Neil’s experiences also seemed to have important implications 
  18
with regard to the ownership of the voices: while Lucy’s voices were mostly 
conceptualised as separate from herself, Neil identified his voices in terms of himself 
(‘sounds like me’). 
 
The reported content of Neil’s voices, however, overlapped with Lucy’s in terms of 
violent material, although there had also been a reported sexual content too: 
 
 Ben: What do the voices generally say? 
 Neil: Well, they’re usually about killing people [ ] 
 Ben: Do they say anything else? 
 Neil: Uh...I think they used to be quite sexual actually. 
 
However, Neil also described a different process which consisted of an internal 
dialogue with himself about philosophical or practical matters: 
 
 Neil: I can have conversations with myself [ ] And they’re not just about 
rubbish - they’re about deep things, you know, and I’m actually like coming 
out with conclusions. [ ] I mean I’m just talking to the person and they’re 
answering and - uh - I’m just having complete discussions and...uh...I come 
out with conclusions. And the weird thing about it is when I come out with a 
conclusion I feel better. 
 Ben: Right. 
Neil: I feel better in myself. I think ‘Oh yeah. Well I’ll do that then’ and 
everything’s alright. It’s - it’s almost as if like...um...I’m reflecting off my 
soul. You know? As if I’m talking to my soul. 
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Again, this passage indicates the extent to which Neil identified the voices with 
himself (‘It’s – it’s almost as if like…um…I’m reflecting off my soul [ ] As if I’m 
talking to my soul’). It also points to a positive aspect of the voices, namely that they 
represent a means of facilitating decision-making processes (which is reminiscent of 
Jaynes’, 1976, contention that the original function of hallucinations was to guide 
action). While in passages such as these Neil seemed open to accepting ownership of 
the voices, when the content was more disturbing, ownership was more likely to be 
denied: 
 
Neil: And then I got a really loud voice, which was very scary [ ] It had quite 
an angry tone to it. Yeah... It was quite nasty. 
 Ben: Was that also your voice, or was it the voice of someone else? 
 Neil: Don’t know...Could be the devil as far as I’m concerned.[ ] 
 Ben: What - what did it say? 
 Neil: [laughs] ‘Kill Mum’. ‘Kill your mother’...Yeah. 
 Ben: What effect did that have on you? 
 Neil: I was just scared. I was just like freaked out. I was shocked. Like - oops 
- my mind’s suddenly lost it, you know [ ] Yeah - I wish I didn’t have these 
thoughts, I really do. But like I say I don’t think it’s my fault. I really don’t. 
 
One might speculate that, for Neil, the extent to which he was willing to accept 
responsibility for and ownership of the voices was a function of their content, with 
highly disturbing thoughts being more likely to be attributed to external sources, such 
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as the devil, rather than to himself. Generally, however, Neil’s conceptualisation of 
the voices entailed a great deal of responsibility on his part, as we shall now see. 
 
The construction of meaning and implications for coping 
Neil’s understanding of the nature of his experience was that the voices were 
primarily an expression of anger which was being denied or suppressed: 
 
 Neil: Um...I think it’s like when I’m not in touch with my anger, anger comes 
out in these thoughts... 
 Ben: And why - why do you think that is? 
 Neil: Well, it needs a release. The energy needs to be released. 
 
In the same way, when the voices were of a sexual nature, Neil tentatively attributed 
this to the suppression of his sexuality. This suppression of unacceptable feelings 
(sometimes sexual but more often aggressive) was represented in hydraulic terms as 
leading to a build-up of tension which then needs to be released. Neil seemed to be 
saying that if this tension or energy was not expressed directly (for example, by 
becoming angry), then it was manifested as voices: 
 
 Why they come as voices I don’t know. I - that’s it - I can’t work out the 
bridge between why...um...a feeling should turn into a voice. Why should it? 
Why don’t I just get into a complete rage to express the anger? That’s the 
more natural - it seems it should come out like that. But it’s maybe that I’m 
suppressing that anger and I’m saying ‘No, you’re not - you’re not going to do 
that’. But it’s got to find some sort of release. 
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While Neil said here that he ‘can’t work out the bridge between why [ ] a feeling 
should turn into a voice’, later in the interview he provided some insight into his 
understanding of why this transformation should take place: 
 
 Cos I’m quite a visual thinker and um...maybe demons represent negativity or 
something that I’m scared of, you know. [ ] I remember I used to wonder 
whether it [the voices] was coming from, you know, a spiritual source or 
somewhere – a dark force – or whether it was coming from me, you know. 
Well, it probably is coming from me. [ ] I just used to get confused in 
the...uh...the metaphors. Like saying ‘demons’ is probably...um...[ ] It’s kind 
of like...um...visualising what – what the feeling actually is. 
 
Here Neil seemed to be saying that one reason for representing his feelings as demons 
or as evil voices is because he sees himself as a ‘visual thinker’ and he sometimes 
gets ‘confused in [ ] the metaphors’. This echoes Segal’s (1989) theory about the 
presumed ‘concrete thinking’ of psychosis, in which symbol and reality become 
confused, leading to what she called the ‘symbolic equation’. In these terms, Neil 
could be seen as symbolising his anger as a demon and then taking this symbolism 
literally so that he experienced his anger as a demonic voice. 
 
Neil’s conceptualisation of his voices shared many features in common with the 
accounts of psychoanalytic theorists who have attempted to describe the 
psychological processes involved in psychosis. For example, Sullivan (1956) talked 
about how the schizophrenic individual banishes parts of the self which are anxiety-
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provoking, dissociating them into what he termed the ‘not-me’. Similarly, the 
Kleinian and object-relations schools have also emphasised this process of defensive 
disintegration in which the ‘ego fragments and splits itself into little bits in order to 
avoid anxiety’ (Segal, 1973:30). These fragmented parts of the self are then said to be 
projected as voices and are consequently experienced as less overwhelming than if 
they had not been externalised in this way. Neil often commented on this experience 
of fragmentation; for example: 
 
 I’m not a whole person. I’m just...there’s little bits of me all over the place. 
You know? All fighting. I need to be brought as one, I need to be aligned. 
 
Neil’s conceptualisation of his voices as dissociated aspects of the self has important 
implications for the management of the voices: 
 
Neil: What I’m trying to say is that if I accept myself for who I am then these 
voices will just disappear. You know? 
 Ben: I mean, have you found that when you’ve...you know, at times when you 
have accepted yourself in a better way - that this has actually had a positive 
effect on the voices? 
 Neil: Yeah, yeah. It does, yeah. It [the voices] doesn’t happen. I’ve become 
more of a whole person. 
 
In more specific terms, this self-acceptance was said to involve recognising his anger 
and expressing it in appropriate ways, rather than suppressing it: 
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 Like the other night I was sitting there and I was thinking ‘I’m pissed off’ and 
I felt a lot...more of a whole person. [ ] I should just accept my anger I think - 
learn how to channel it, you know. Maybe I would be better off letting out my 
anger there and then, you know, because it would probably come out and it 
wouldn’t be as bad as I’m – as when I suppress it and it comes out as these 
voices. 
 
Here Neil suggested that accepting his anger and learning how to ‘channel it’ 
appropriately, would have a beneficial effect on the voices; he reported that on those 
occasions when he has recognised his anger, this has indeed been the case. He 
attributed the efficacy of this strategy to the fact that it helped to reduce his sense of 
fragmentation and allowed him to become a ‘whole person’ again. 
 
Overview 
The analysis presented here cannot claim to have accessed general themes and 
processes in the interpretation of and response to hearing voices because it has 
focused on only two participants whose ‘typicality’ cannot be ascertained. Its value 
lies in its exploration of these issues through participants’ own words and (mediated 
versions of their) phenomenological worlds. 
 
Perhaps the most notable feature of the accounts provided by Lucy and Neil was the 
relationship that they forged between the meanings they attributed to their voices and 
the strategies they used to manage or cope with this experience. Neil’s explanatory 
framework primarily involved conceptualising the voices as dissociated aspects of the 
self and, more specifically, that the voices represented an expression of anger (and, to 
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a lesser extent, sexuality) which was being denied. His reported efforts at managing 
the voices stemmed directly from this conceptualisation: by accepting his anger and 
therefore reclaiming the dissociated parts of his self, the voices were less likely to 
manifest themselves. Lucy’s account, on the other hand, revealed greater uncertainty 
about the causes and nature of the voices: she did not offer one unitary explanation 
but considered several possible interpretations about the meaning of the voices. This 
diversity was also reflected in her strategies for dealing with the voices. While Neil 
mentioned only one coping strategy – and one which was logically implied by his 
conceptualisation of the voices – Lucy’s reported coping efforts were more diverse 
and were employed on a ‘trial and error’ basis. One might argue that the flexibility of 
Lucy’s approach to coping was a consequence of the lack of persuasive power which 
any single interpretation about the meaning of the voices held for her.  
 
This study stands in contrast to much of the research which has investigated voice 
hearers’ coping strategies and which has examined these strategies in isolation, 
without reference to individuals’ subjective understandings of their voices. Although 
the findings of this exploratory study are not generalisable, it would seem that the 
relationship between the meaning which individuals attribute to their voices and their 
coping efforts is one which merits further investigation. 
 
If this link were to be more firmly ascertained, this would carry implications for 
psychotherapeutic professionals working with clients who hear voices. Others have 
already highlighted the need for individuals’ perceptions of the ‘reality’ of their 
voices to be taken seriously in therapy and for hallucination as an experience to be 
separated from hallucination as a symptom of psychopathology (du Plock, 1995; 
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Parker et al., 1995). This study has further highlighted the potential importance of 
entering the client’s meaning-making world and attending to the subjective 
understanding which clients develop in relation to their voices, particularly in terms 
of the explanations they construct. A focus on developing meaning-making could 
help to meet a client’s need for persuasive explanations. This in turn could form a 
basis for developing appropriate responses to the voices which are congruent with the 
individual’s interpretations of them - thereby addressing reservations about 
advocating phenomenologically decontextualised ‘coping mechanisms’ in response to 
life trauma (Jacobsen et al., 2000) – and which reduce their capacity to interfere with 
functioning and cause distress. 
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